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Abstract
Schumpeterian growth theory based on creative destruction was
originally designed for continuous time innovation and growth models.
However its recently expanding use in DSGE modelling calls for an
easily usable discrete time recast. We here show how to construct
a discrete time version of creative destruction fully equivalent to its
continuous time counterpart.
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1 Introduction
Following Benigno and Fornaros (2018) benchmark contribution on the un-
employment and growth consequences of the zero lower bound constraint of
monetary policy in the presence of nominal frictions and Schumpeterian cre-
ative destruction, more and more authors1 are currently trying to integrate
creative destruction-driven growth with dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium (DSGE) modelling. The source of growth used in the literature borrows
much from the established research and development (R&D) and growth the-
ory based on Schumpeterian creative destruction (Aghion and Howitt, 1992,
Grossman and Helpman, 1991, etc), which has the advantage of being con-
sistent with the microeconomic evidence that resource reallocation from less
productive obsolete rms to more productive innovative rms is important for
growth. However, the R&D and innovation technology used in this literature
is explicitly designed for continuous time. In particular, creative destruc-
tion follows an endogenous innovation probability per unit time modelled
as a Poisson process. When recast in discrete time, which is necessary for
usual DSGE modelling, the simplifying properties of the Poisson process are
lost, with potentially devastating complications. In particular, the discrete
time models, by assuming that one innovation is possible per period, literally
taken imply that if more rms are trying to innovate, it is possible that more
than one happens to patent the innovation at the end of the period. With
free entry of an indenite number of R&D rms, the distribution of potential
patent holders at the end of the period becomes too complex. An elegant
way out of this problem is to assume that in each sector and in each period
one and only one entrepreneur is randomly selected with the opportunity
to try to innovate.2 However, while insightfully introducing into creative
destruction the concept of the scarcity of innovations (Scotchmer, 2004), this
sacrices free entry into R&D, at the heart of the growth driven by Schum-
peterian patent races (Aghion and Howitt, 1992, Grossman and Helpman,
1991). Alternatively, in order to maintain Schumpeterian patent races, Be-
nigno and Fornaro (2018) assume a very small time unit that approximately
behaves like continuous time
1See, for example, Pinchetti (2016), and Cozzi et. al (2017).
2Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) pioneered this approach. Also see Aghion
and Howitt (2009) for several very interesting applications (not in DSGE). See Nuno (2011)
for a real business cycle application.
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In this paper we will generalize Benigno and Fornaros (2018) assump-
tion and show how a simple to apply discrete time innovation process leads
to a straightforward translation of the continuous time modelling into dis-
crete time. This is potentially useful to microfound the generality of the
Schumpeterian DSGE models. In particular, while we accept the usual dis-
crete time models assumption that only one innovation is found per period,
we will maintain the continuous time implication that only one rm is the
rst to nd the innovation. This is, in our opinion, very natural, because
a discrete time patent race is a tractable parody of a more realistic patent
race in continuous time. Hence, given the cardinality of the continuum, the
probability of two rms simultaneously winning the patent race is indeed
zero. We claim that this property should never be lost in the discrete time
simplication of the patent race-driven growth models.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows the need of
recasting innovation from continuous time to discrete time. Section 3 shows
our solution to this problem. Section 4 concludes.
2 One Process ts All?
2.1 Continuous Time - a Refresh
In the standard quality ladder model of Aghion and Howitt (1992 and 2009),
Grossman and Helpman (1991), Segerstrom (1998), etc. time is continuous,
and there is a continuum of di¤erentiated consumption or intermediate goods
! 2 [0; 1], with vertical innovation carried out by outsider R&D rms. At
any time t, due to instantaneous price competition and constant returns to
scale, each sector ! 2 [0; 1] is temporarily monopolized by the owner of
the blueprint on the top quality product is j(!; t) 2 N , until an outsider
R&D rm manages to invent the j(!; t) + 1st quality as a result of its R&D
investment. Let l(!; h; t) denote the R&D employment3 of rm h in sector !
at date t, with w(t) the corresponding real wage. It is usually assumed that
resulting probability intensity of innovation per unit time by rm h is
I(!; h; t) =
l(!; h; t)
X(!; t)
(1)
3Results would be identical if we assumed that also nal or intermediate goods are used
in R&D.
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where X(!; t) denotes a potentially time varying di¢culty index of R&D
in the sector.4
Since all innovative Poisson processes are assumed to be independent
across rms and sectors, we can write the sectorial probability, I(!; t), per
unit time of a quality jump by summing (1) for the number H(!; t) 2 N of
R&D rms in sector ! active at time t, that is:
I(!; t) =
H(!;t)X
h=1
I(!; h; t). (2)
Notice that in eq. (2) we simply summed the rm probabilities because the
probability of two innovations occurring at the same time is zero. Hence the
individual rms probability of appropriating the innovation per unit time
remains the same, regardless of the total ow probability.
Using (1) and (2), a generic R&D rm hs expected prot maximization
at time t in an instantaneous patent race for product quality j(!; t) + 1 of
value V (!; j(!; t) + 1; t) can be rewritten as
max
l0
l(!; h; t)
X(!; t)
V (!; j(!; t) + 1; t+ 1)  w(t)l(!; h; t). (3)
This leads to the R&D free entry (zero prot) condition
V (!; j(!; t) + 1; t+ 1)
X(!; t)
= w(t) (4)
as in standard Schumpeterian models (Aghion and Howitt, 1992, Grossman
and Helpman, 1991, Segerstrom, 1998, Howitt, 1999, etc).
2.2 Discrete Time
Let us now abandon continuous time and assume that, like the generality of
DSGE models, time is discrete, t = 0; 1; 2; :::. As in the literature we make
the following:
Assumption 1. Only one innovation can be made and patented per period.
Remark. This means that there is only one patent race per period.
4For example, Segerstrom (1998) and Howitt (1999) use it to elimate the strong scale
e¤ect with semi-endogenous respectively endogenous growth e¤ects.
4
Consistently with the continuous time industrys innovation process in
which the single rm contribution I(!; h; t) from eq. (1) is part the total
probability of success - now constrained not to exceed 1. In fact, we will also
assume the following:
Assumption 2. The total probability of the new product of quality j(!; t)+
1 being invented at time t+ 1 is
I(!; t) = min
8<
:
H(!;t)X
h=1
I(!; h; t); 1
9=
; . (5)
So far nothing new. However, the previous two assumptions leave the
door open to the possibility that more rms will win the patent race, which
would contrast the very concept of realistic patent races, which do take place
in continuos time. Moreover, literally relying on these two assumptions, as
we try to study the R&D rms optimizing behavior and the industrys R&D
free entry condition, complications start: for example, if in a duopoly each
rm taken in isolation had probability 1=3 of appropriating the quality jump,
each will be the only one to make the quality jump only with probability (1 
1=3)1=3, that is 2=9. If both rms innovate, which happens with probability
1=9, the patent has to be either shared or randomly assigned. With a generic
number, H(!; t), of rms in the industry it becomes impossible to write down
an R&D free entry condition as simple as eq. (4).
3 A Simple Solution
We propose a simple and harmless solution, based on the consideration that
between the beginning and the end of a discrete time runs a continuous
time patent race, in which the probability of simultaneous innovation and
patenting is zero. This does not require that the period is vanishingly small:
if the time unit is quarterly, within three months of R&D there will be a rst
rm that nds the idea and patents it, thereby appropriating all the value of
that periods innovation. Hence we us make the following:
Assumption 3. If rm h wins the patent race in period t no other rm
h0 6= h can also win it.
Remark. Our assumption means that if in reality the patent race between
t and t+ 1 occurs in continuous time, the discrete time approximation shall
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just observe which rm has been the winner in period [t; t + 1], rather than
allowing the completely unrealistic assumption of more rms having won that
race.
We will also make the following:
Assumption 4. The probability of rm hs being the inventor of this new
good, conditional on the good being invented, is
I(!; h; t)
I(!; t)
. (6)
Remark. Note that the total probability of innovation in the industry
and the chances of a generic rm h succeeding in the patent rate will depend
on the whole set of probability inputs fI(!; h; t)g
H(!;t)
h=1 . However notice that
at the aggregate economy level all single industry processes can safely be
assumed independent.
Consequently, the probability of R&D success for rm h in sector ! is just
the probability of the innovation happening, which depends on the aggregate
R&D in sector !, multiplied by the probability of appropriating it conditional
on the innovation happening, that is:
I(!; t)
I(!; h; t)
I(!; t)
= I(!; h; t). (7)
Using (1) and(7), a generic R&D rm hs expected prot maximization in
a patent race in period t for product quality j(!; t)+1 of value V (!; j(!; t)+
1; t+ 1) can be rewritten as
max
l0
l(!; h; t)
X(!; t)
Et [V (!; j(!; t) + 1; t+ 1)]  w(t)l(!; h; t) (8)
where Et is the expectation operator conditional on information up to time
t. This leads to the same free entry condition
Et [V (!; j(!; t) + 1; t+ 1)]
X(!; t)
= w(t) (9)
as in eq. (4).
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3.1 Robustness
3.1.1 Stepping on Toes
Our result can be easily generalized to R&D production functions incorpo-
rating the widely adopted Jones and Williams (1998) "stepping-on-toes"
negative externalities of industry R&D. In fact, we could rewrite (1) as
I(!; h; t) =
l(!; h; t)
X(!; t)

l(!; t)
X(!; t)
 a
(10)
where
l(!; t) 
PH(!;t)
h0=1 l(!; h
0; t)
H(!; t)
is the average R&D employment in industry ! in period t. The R&D rm
expected prot maximization would become
max
l(!;h;t)0
l(!; h; t)
X(!; t)

l(!; t)
X(!; t)
 a
Et [V (!; j(!; t) + 1; t+ 1)]  w(t)l(!; h; t)
(11)
leading to the modied free entry condition
Et [V (!; j(!; t) + 1; t+ 1)]
X(!; t)

l(!; t)
X(!; t)
 a
= w(t). (12)
In a symmetric equilibrium l(!; h; t) = l(!; t), so that (10) simplies to
I(!; h; t) =

l(!; t)
X(!; t)
1 a
= I(!; t), (13)
which gives equilibrium rst order condition
Et [V (!; j(!; t) + 1; t+ 1)]
X(!; t)
I(!; t)
 a
1 a = w(t). (14)
Given the value of the future patent, V (!; t + 1), the R&D di¢culty index,
X(!; t), and the wage rate, w(t), the probability of an innovation arriving at
the end of period t is
I(!; t) =

Et [V (!; j(!; t) + 1; t+ 1)]
X(!; t)w(t)
 1 a
a
. (15)
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4 Final Remarks
We have provided a simple denition of the R&D investment process in
the Schumpeterian innovation process that allows a direct translation of the
usual continuous time R&D equations into their workable discrete time coun-
terpart. This is potentially useful for a whole class of DSGE models with
Schumpeterian growth. We claim that our simplied approach is a natural
consequence of assuming that in each sector and in each period there is one
underlying patent race driving innovation.
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